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11 Introduction
Cities of the developing world are often characterized by their large size, high unemployment,
high poverty, a large fraction of rural migrants, and poor transport infrastructure. It is our
contention that these diﬀerent characteristics are strongly linked together and only policies
taking into account all these aspects and thus the interaction between diﬀerent markets can
be successful. In particular, we believe that the lack of good transport system in developing
cities can have a big inﬂuence on labor market outcomes. A good example is India where
the overall population growth and increasing urbanization have led to the especially rapid
growth of large cities,1 so that the poor population must spend up to three or four hours a
day for travel (Pucher et al., 2005).2 Improving the transport system in such a country can
have important eﬀects on workers’ labor market outcomes.
We thus need to develop a model where all these features are present. The Harris Todaro
framework (Todaro, 1969; Harris and Todaro, 1970) has become a cornerstone of models of
rural urban migration. The aim of the Harris Todaro framework is to explain the persistent
rural urban migration in developing countries despite the high unemployment rates in cities.
The original model has been extended in diﬀerent directions (see the literature surveys by
Basu, 1997, Part III; Ray, 1998, Chap. 10) to explain this puzzle. We believe that two
aspects are particularly important in order to tackle the issues mentioned above and should
be introduced if one wants to understand the policy implications of such a model. First, one
should consider a search matching labor market in the city in order to endogeneize wages and
unemployment. Indeed, there are large evidence showing that cities in developing countries
are characterized by important search frictions due to coordination failures, mismatch costs
and lack of information about jobs (see, e.g., Rama, 1998; Bosch et al., 2007; Bosch and
Maloney, 2008). Second, an explicit land/housing market should be incorporated in the city
to study the relationship between rural urban migration and the land market. Indeed, a city
diﬀers from a rural area not only because of the speciﬁcity of its labor market (as in the
standard Harris Todaro model) but also because of its land/housing market.
1By 2001, India had three megacities: Mumbai (Bombay) with 16.4 million inhabitants, Kolkata (Cal-
cutta) with 13.2 million inhabitants, and Delhi with 12.8 million inhabitants. And 35 metropolitan areas
had populations exceeding one million, almost twice as many as in 1991 (Oﬃce of the Registrar General of
India, 2001).
2See also Carruthers et al. (2005) who show that workers in developing countries spend a signiﬁcant
amount of their income on transportation.
2There is a tradition of search models in the migration literature that only model one side of
the market (the workers) so that ﬁrms’ behavior and thus job creation are not considered (see
e.g. Fields, 1975, 1989, Banerjee, 1984, Mohtadi, 1989). There is a more recent literature,
which incorporates a search matching labor market a la Pissarides Mortensen (Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1999; Pissarides, 2000) in a Harris Todaro model (see Coulson et al., 2001;
Ortega, 2000; Sato, 2004; Laing et al., 2005; Zenou, 2008; Albrecht et al., 2009; Satchi and
Temple, 2009).3 None of these models, however, have an explicit land market where workers
choose their residential location in the city.
In this paper, we propose a rural urban migration model where the city is characterized
by both a search matching labor market and an explicit land/housing market. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that performs such an analysis. This allows us not
only to characterize and to study the properties of the steady state equilibrium but also to
analyze the impact of three policies on labor market outcomes.4
To be more precise, we develop a model where there are search frictions in the city so
that unemployment prevails there5 whereas the rural area is competitive. In the city, the
wage is determined by a bargaining between workers and ﬁrms and because of search fric 
tions, unemployment emerges in equilibrium. In the rural area, workers are paid at their
marginal productivity, so that there is full employment. Depending on their employment
status, workers optimally decide whether to live in the city or in the rural area. We char 
acterize the steady state equilibrium of the economy with rural urban migration and show
that the equilibrium exists and is unique but not eﬃcient because of search externalities.
We then consider three diﬀerent policies: a transportation policy that improves the public
transport system in the city, an entry cost policy that encourages investment in the city and
3For an overview, see Zenou (2009).
4There are few theoretical papers analyzing transport policies in an explicit urban framework (exceptions
include Zenou, 2000; Borck and Wrede, 2005; 2009; Brueckner, 2006; Brueckner and Selod, 2006; Wrede 2001)
and even less papers studying the impact of such policies on labor-market outcomes of workers (exception
includes Zenou, 2000, who looks at an eﬃciency wage model with no rural-urban migration). Van Ommeren
et al. (1999), Van Ommeren and Rietveld (2005), and De Borger (2009) study commuting issues in a search
model but there is no land market.
5Cities in less developed countries are often characterized by an informal sector. In our analysis, the
unemployed workers are basically the infomal workers. In this perspective, the informal sector would be a
disadvantaged sector in a segmented labor market where informal workers would try to obtain a formal job.
This is certainly true in African countries but less true in Latin American ones (Maloney, 2004).
3a restricting migration policy that imposes some costs on migrants. We show that all policies
can increase urban employment but the transportation policy has much more drastic eﬀects.
This is because a decrease in commuting costs has both a direct negative eﬀect on land rents,
which encourages migrants to move to the city, and a direct negative eﬀect on urban wages,
which reduces job creation and thus migration. When these two eﬀects are combined with
search frictions, the interactions between the land and the labor markets have amplifying
positive eﬀects on urban employment. Thus, improving the transport infrastructure in cities
can have important positive eﬀects on urban employment despite the induced migration from
rural areas.
2 Model and notations
There are two areas: an urban area (the city, denoted by the superscript C) and a rural
area (denoted by the superscript R). As in the standard Harris Todaro model, in rural
areas, it is assumed that workers are paid at their marginal productivity so that there is
no unemployment. Therefore, if N denotes the total population in the economy, the total
population in rural areas is LR = NR, where LR is the employment level. As a result, the
total population in cities is equal to: NC = LC +UC (where LC and UC are respectively the
employment and unemployment levels in cities), with N = NC + NR. In this context, the
unemployment level in cities is given by:
U




It is assumed that there are search frictions6 in the city and we use the standard search
matching framework (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Pissarides, 2000) to model these fric 
tions. There is a continuum of ﬁrms. A ﬁrm is a unit of production that can either be ﬁlled
by a worker whose production is y units of output or be unﬁlled and thus unproductive.
In order to ﬁnd a worker, a ﬁrm posts a vacancy. A vacancy can be ﬁlled according to a
random Poisson process. Similarly, workers searching for a job will ﬁnd one according to
6As deﬁned by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), “market friction is the costly delay in the process of
ﬁnding trading partners and determining the terms of trade.” In other words, search frictions imply that it
takes time and other resources for a worker to obtain a job and for a ﬁrm to ﬁll a vacancy.
4a random Poisson process. In aggregate, these processes imply that there is a number of





where s is the average search eﬃciency of the unemployed workers and V C denotes the total
number of vacancies in the city. It is assumed that s = s, so each worker provides the same
search eﬀort s, which is exogenous. As in the standard search matching model (see e.g.
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, and Pissarides, 2000), we assume that  (.) is increasing
both in its arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree 1 (or equivalently has constant
return to scale). Thus, the rate at which vacancies are ﬁlled is  (sUC,V C)/V C. By constant









is a measure of labor market tightness in eﬃciency units and q(θC) is a Poisson intensity. By
using the properties of  (.), it is easily veriﬁed that q′(θC) ≤ 0: the higher the labor market
tightness, the lower the rate at which ﬁrm ﬁll their vacancy. Similarly, the rate at which an







where a(θC) ≡ sθCq(θC) is the job acquisition rate. Again, by using the properties of  (.), it
is easily veriﬁed that a′(θC) ≥ 0: the higher the labor market tightness, the higher the rate
at which workers leave unemployment since there are relatively more jobs than unemployed
workers. Also, the higher the search intensity s (unemployed search more actively for jobs),
the higher is this rate a(θC). Finally, the rate at which jobs are destroyed is exogenous and
denoted by δ.
If there are no frictions in this model, then unemployment and vacancies disappear, and












7This matching function is written under the assumption that the city is monocentric, i.e. all ﬁrms are













That is, if θC → 0, then the number of unemployed is inﬁnite and thus ﬁrms ﬁlled their job
instantaneously (no frictions on the ﬁrm’s side), whereas if θC → +∞, then the number of
vacancies is inﬁnite and thus workers ﬁnd a job instantaneously (no frictions on the worker’s
side).
2.2 The rural area
There is no unemployment in rural areas.8 Everybody can thus obtain a job in the rural
area and it is assumed that the rural wage is ﬂexible enough to guarantee that there is
full employment; this wage is denoted by wR




R) > 0 and F
′′(L
R) ≤ 0 (5)
which means that the rural productivity per worker is yR = F(LR)/LR. The price of the
good is taken as a numeraire and, without loss of generality, normalized to 1. As stated







A steady state equilibrium in the city requires solving simultaneously an urban land use
equilibrium and a labor market equilibrium. For presentation convenience, we ﬁrst present
the former and then the latter.
2.3 Urban-land use equilibrium
There is a continuum of equally productive workers whose mass is NC and who are uniformly
distributed along a linear and monocentric city. All land is owned by absentee landlords and
all ﬁrms are exogenously located in the Central Business District (CBD hereafter). There is
no vacant land. The CBD is a unique employment center located at one end of the linear
8In rural areas, most workers are employed within the broader context of the family, so search frictions
are liable to be small. As a result, we only assume search frictions in the city.
6city. Without loss of generality, the density of residential land parcels is taken to be unity, so
that there are exactly x units of housing within a distance x from the CBD. Workers decide
their optimal place of residence between the CBD and the city fringe.
Each individual is identiﬁed with one unit of labor. Each employed worker goes to the
CBD to work and incurs a ﬁxed monetary commuting cost τ per unit of distance. When
living at a distance x from the CBD, he/she also pays a land rent R(x), consumes 1 unity of
land and earns a wage wC
L (that will be determined at the labor market equilibrium).9 The
instantaneous (indirect) utility of an employed worker located at a distance x from the CBD
is thus equal to:
W
C
L (x) = w
C
L − τ x − R
C(x) (7)
Concerning the unemployed workers, we assume that they do not receive any unemploy 
ment beneﬁt, as it is the case in most developing countries.10 Moreover, they commute less
often to the CBD than the employed workers since they mainly go there to search for jobs.
So, we assume that they incur a commuting cost sτ per unit of distance, where 0 < s ≤ 1 is
a measure of search intensity. For example s = 1 would mean that the unemployed workers
go everyday to the CBD (as often as the employed workers) to search for jobs. Observe that
here we assume that the unemployed workers need to go to the CBD to obtain information
about jobs and this is why they need to commute there. If, for example, s = 0, which we
exclude here, then they would never ﬁnd a job. The instantaneous (indirect) utility of an
unemployed worker residing at a distance x from the CBD is equal to:
W
C
U (x) = −sτ x − R
C(x) (8)
An urban equilibrium is such that all the employed workers enjoy the same level of utility
W C
L while all the unemployed workers obtain WC
U . Bid rents11 are respectively given by:
ΨL(x,W
C
L ) = w
C





U ) = −sτ x − W
C
U (10)
9The subscript L refers to the employed workers whereas the subscript U refers to the unemployed workers.
10None of our results will be aﬀected with positive unemployment beneﬁts.
11The bid rent indicates the maximum land rent that a worker located at a distance x from the CBD is
ready to pay in order to achieve an equilibrium utility.
7They are both linear and decreasing in x. Because employed workers experience higher
commuting costs, they have steeper bid rents and thus reside closer to the CBD.
Deﬁnition 1 An urban-land use equilibrium is a 3-tuple (WC∗
L ,W C∗



























Equations (11) and (12) reﬂect the equilibrium conditions in the land market. Equation
(11) says that, in the land market, at the frontier LC between the employed and unemployed
workers, the bid rent oﬀered by the employed is equal to the bid rent oﬀered by the unem 
ployed workers. Equation (12), in turn, says that the bid rent of the unemployed workers
must be equal to the agricultural land RA (which is normalized to zero) at the city fringe.
Finally, equation (13) deﬁnes the equilibrium land rent as the upper envelope of the equi 
librium bid rent curves of all workers and the agricultural rent line. Figure 1 illustrates this
equilibrium.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
By solving (11) and (12), we easily obtain the equilibrium values of the instantaneous




































the unemployment zone (i.e. the residential zone for unemployed workers) is: [LC,NC]. By
plugging (14) and (15) into (9) and (10), we easily obtain the land rent equilibrium RC∗(x).
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N − LR − LC
 
for 0 ≤ x ≤ LC
sτ
 
N − LR − x
 
for LC < x ≤ NC
0 for x > NC
(16)
8The main diﬀerence with the spatial model without migration (Wasmer and Zenou, 2002;
2006) is that the utility of urban workers as well as the equilibrium land rent now depend
on LR, the employment level of rural workers. This is because rural urban migration aﬀects







Indeed, since LR will be determined by an equilibrium migration condition (see below), then
when more workers are employed in the rural area, there is less migration to the city and
thus less competition in the urban land market so that housing prices decrease.
2.4 Labor equilibrium in cities
We are now able to solve the labor market equilibrium and thus the steady state equilibrium.
We have:
Deﬁnition 2 A (steady-state) labor market equilibrium (w∗
L,θC∗,LC∗) is such that, given the
matching technology M( ), all agents (workers and ﬁrms) maximize their respective objective
function, i.e. this triple is determined by a steady-state condition, a free-entry condition for
ﬁrms and a wage-setting mechanism.







































where r is the exogenous discount rate, and IC
L and IC
U denote the expected lifetime utility
of an employed worker and a job seeker, respectively. The ﬁrst equation that determines IC
L
states that an employed worker obtains today W C∗
L = wC
L − τ LC − sτ
 
N − LR − LC
 
but
can loose his/her job at rate δ and then obtains a negative surplus of IC
U − IC
L. For the job





today but may ﬁnd a job at
rate a(θC), and then obtains a surplus equals to IC
L − IC
U. Because there are no relocation
9costs, in equilibrium all workers must reach the same utility level independently of their













L − (1 − s)τLC
r + δ + a(θC)
(19)
We denote respectively by IC
F and IC
V the intertemporal proﬁt of a job and of a vacancy
in the city. If γ is the search cost for the ﬁrm per unit of time and yC is the product of the
match, then, in steady state, IC
F and IC



























r + δ + q(θC)
We assume that ﬁrms post vacancies up to a point where:
I
C
V = 0 (22)







Finally, plugging (23) into (20) and using (22), we obtain the following decreasing relation








In words, the value of an urban job is equal to the expected search cost, i.e. the cost per unit
of time multiplied by the average duration of search for the ﬁrm. So, ﬁrms’ job creation is
endogenous and determined by (24).
Let us now calculate the wage. At each period, the total intertemporal surplus is shared
through a generalized Nash bargaining process between the ﬁrm and the worker. The total




U, and the surplus of the ﬁrms IC
F −IC
V .





























It is worth noting that space only enters here in the wage equation by adding one new
term (1 − β)(1 − s)τLC (Wasmer and Zenou, 2002; 2006). This is what ﬁrms must pay to
induce workers to accept the job oﬀer: ﬁrms must exactly compensate the transportation
cost diﬀerence (between the employed and the unemployed) of the employed worker who is
the furthest away from the CBD, i.e. located at x = LC. All the other eﬀects are similar to
the ones found in the non spatial model (Pissarides, 2000). By combining (24) and (26), we






r + δ + β a(θC∗)
q(θC∗)
 
+ (1 − s)τL
C∗ (27)
Compared to the non spatial model, the main diﬀerence is that now θC∗ is a function of LC∗
through the spatial cost compensation (1 − s)τLC∗. Not surprisingly, an increase in LC∗
decreases urban job creation since it augments (1 − s)τLC∗ and thus the wage, which, in
turn, deters entry.
Let us now close the model. Each job is destroyed according to a Poisson process with
arrival rate δ. Thus, the number of workers who enter unemployment in the city is δLC and
the number who leave unemployment is sθCq(θ)C
 
N − LC − LR
 
since UC = N −LC −LR
(see (1)). In steady state, ﬂows in and out unemployment have to be equal and we obtain










Again, compared to the spatial model without migration, in addition to the relationship
between LC∗ and θC∗, there are now two new relationships, one between LC∗ and LR∗, and
one between θC∗ and LR∗. For a given θC∗, an increase in LR∗ reduces LC∗. Also, for a
given LC∗, the relationship between θC∗ and LR∗ is positive. Indeed, when more workers are
employed in the rural area, urban employment has to decrease for (28) to hold. Similarly, if
urban employment is ﬁxed, then job creation has to increase following an increase in rural
employment for (28) to hold.
112.5 Rural-urban migration
Concerning rural urban migration, we assume that a rural worker cannot search from home
but must ﬁrst be unemployed in the city (to gather information about jobs) and then searches
for a job. There are plenty of evidence, especially in developing countries, showing that to
obtain an urban (formal) job, one needs local contacts and local information about jobs (see
e.g. Banerjee, 1984; Wahba and Zenou, 2005). As a result, as described in Figure 1, a rural
worker who migrates to the city will ﬁrst reside in the unemployment area anywhere between














That is rural workers will migrate to the city up to the point where their expected lifetime
utility is equal to the expected utility they will obtain in cities as unemployed workers.
Indeed, the left hand side of this equation, IC
U, is the intertemporal utility of moving to












/r, corresponds to the intertemporal utility of staying in
rural areas. By using (6), (18), (19), (26), and remembering that RA = 0, the migration
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We have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3 An Harris-Todaro equilibrium with search externalities and a land market is
a 6-tuple (θC∗,LC∗,LR∗,WC∗
L ,W C∗
U ,RC∗(x)) such that (27), (28), (30), (14), (15) and (16)
are satisﬁed.
In fact, there are three unknowns θC∗,LC∗, and LR∗ and three equations (27), (28), and
(30), to be determined (the other equations are independent). By plugging the value of LC∗






r + δ + β a(θC∗)
1 − β
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As a result, we end up with two unknowns θC∗ and LR∗ and two equations (31) and (32).
Equation (31) is the job-creation condition (or labor demand) that deﬁnes a relationship




. It is really the urban land market that introduces
this relationship through the spatial compensation costs (1 − s)τLC∗. In a standard non 
spatial model (as in Pissarides, 2000), τ = 0, and this equation deﬁnes a unique θC∗ as
a function of parameters only. Equation (32) is the rural-urban migration condition that




. Indeed, job creation in
cities aﬀects rural urban migration because better employment prospects in cities trigger
more migration.
It is easy to show that there exists a unique steady equilibrium. This equilibrium is not
eﬃcient because of search and migration externalities. So we would like now to consider dif 
ferent policies that aim at reducing urban unemployment and increasing urban employment.
4 Policies
4.1 Transportation policies
As stated in the Introduction, our aim is to evaluate transportation policies. We look here
at a decrease in commuting costs τ for all workers. This is the case, for example, when
the local government invests in transportation infrastructures (for example, building new
roads) or in improving the city transportation network (adding new buses or trains). This
will, obviously, reduce the costs of commuting of all workers in the city. For example, in
India, the public transport system is very bad since most buses and trains in cities are old
and poorly designed, inadequately maintained, dangerously overcrowded, undependable, and
slow (Acharya, 2000). Subsidizing commuting costs in our model is equivalent to expanding
and improving public transport systems.12
12Urban road pavement is also a way of improving transportation in developing countries. See, in par-
ticular, Gonzalez-Navarro and Quintana-Domeque (2010) who show that urban road pavement provision
in Mexico improves the life of the nearby residents and reduce their commuting costs. See also Jalan and
Ravallion (2002) who argue that road constructions can reduce poverty in developing countries.







Proposition 1 Assume that the productivity diﬀerence between rural and urban areas is
large enough.14 Assume further that ηLτ > 1. Then, a decrease in transportation costs τ
leads to:
(i) an increase in job creation in the city θC∗;
(ii) an ambiguous eﬀect on LC∗ and on LR∗. However, if
     ∂θC∗
∂τ




Result (i) is quite intuitive. If urban employment is very sensitive to commuting costs
(ηLτ > 1), then reducing commuting costs increases job creation in cities. Indeed, when
commuting costs decrease, it becomes cheaper to hire workers (remember that part of the
bargained wage was to compensate workers for their commuting costs) and thus more ﬁrms
enter the labor market. The eﬀects of τ on urban and rural employment are ambiguous
because there are two opposite eﬀects: a direct positive one and an indirect negative one












r + δ + β a(θC)
q(θC)
  


















      
Indirect negative eﬀect
When τ decreases, there is a direct positive eﬀect on urban employment since, as stated
above, it becomes cheaper for ﬁrms to hire workers. However, because job creation increases,
there is also an indirect negative eﬀect on employment. Indeed, as θC∗ increases following
13The proofs of all propositions can be found in the Appendix.
14The exact condition is given in the Appendix. See (49).
14a decrease in τ, wages rise (see (26)) and it becomes more diﬃcult to ﬁll a vacancy since
q′(θC) ≤ 0. The net eﬀect is thus ambiguous but if
     ∂θC∗
∂τ
      is low enough, then obviously the
ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second one and ∂LC
∂τ < 0. Furthermore, because of the steady state
ﬂows equation (28), the eﬀect of τ on LR∗ has the opposite sign in order for (28) to be
satisﬁed.
What is crucial in a transportation policy is that it directly aﬀects the housing and the
labor market. Indeed, when τ is reduced, the price of land/housing decreases everywhere in
the city (see (16)). This, in turn, aﬀects wages since ﬁrms need to compensate less workers
for their spatial costs and therefore wages decrease (see (26)). As a result, ﬁrms create more
jobs and thus θC∗ increases. This has an indirect negative eﬀect on wages. These both eﬀects
(lower land rents and higher chance of ﬁnding a job) induce rural workers to migrate to the
city, which eventually reduce urban employment. This implies, in particular, that there are
amplifying eﬀects because of the interaction between the land and labor markets.
4.2 Subsidizing ﬁrms’ entry cost
Another interesting policy to be considered is the one that reduces the entry cost γ of ﬁrms in
the city. For example, the government could encourage investment and job creation in cities
by helping new ﬁrms to establish there. This has been a common policy in Europe and in
the United States where governments (for example, Ireland with IBM) have attracted ﬁrms
in certain areas by giving them a tax relief during a pre deﬁned period of time. Enterprise
Zone (EZ) programs aiming at revitalizing depressed local areas also supply tax relief and
other subsidies to targeted depressed areas (see, e.g. Boarnet and Bogart, 1996; Potter and
Moore, 2000; Bondonio, D. and R.T. Greenbaum, 2007; Busso et al., 2010).
In our model, we have the following result.
Proposition 2 Assume that the productivity diﬀerence between rural and urban areas is
large enough.15 Then, a decrease in the ﬁrms’ entry cost γ in the city leads to:
(i) an increase in job creation in the city θC∗;
(ii) an ambiguous eﬀect on LC∗ and on LR∗. However, if
     ∂θC∗
∂γ




15The exact condition is given in the Appendix. See (49).
15When the government reduces ﬁrms’ entry cost in the city, more ﬁrms holding a vacant
job enter the labor market and therefore more jobs are created (θC∗ increases). The eﬀect
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Indirect negative eﬀect
When γ decreases, there is a direct positive eﬀect on urban employment since more jobs
are created and workers ﬁnd jobs at a higher rate. There is, however, an indirect negative
eﬀect through θC∗ since, when job creation increases, wages also increase and it becomes
more diﬃcult to ﬁll a vacancy since q′(θC) ≤ 0. As a result, the net eﬀect is ambiguous. If,
however,
     ∂θC∗
∂γ
      is low enough, which means that the positive eﬀect on job creation is not too
strong, then a decrease in the entry cost increases urban employment and decreases rural
employment. As with the transportation policy, LC∗and LR∗ are negatively related through
the steady state ﬂows equation (28), and thus we have the opposite sign for the eﬀect of τ
on LR∗.
Observe that the entry cost policy operates very diﬀerently than the transportation pol 
icy. Indeed, the latter has a direct impact on the land market and thus aﬀects rural urban
migration through the resulting increase in housing prices. The former has no direct impact
on the housing market and aﬀects migration through the increase in job creation. Further 
more, because the transportation policy has a direct impact on the land market, the eﬀects
of a reduction of τ on labor market outcomes are ampliﬁed and are much stronger than in
the entry cost policy. We will investigate further these issues when we compare these two
policies.
4.3 Restricting rural-urban migration
We would like now to consider another policy aiming at directly restricting the migration to
the cities. For example, in China, internal migration is regulated through a hukou system.
16Instituted in 1958, the hukou requires every citizen seeking a change in residence to obtain a
permission from the public security bureau. Hukou is eﬀectively an internal passport system
that makes the process of moving between or within provinces analogous to the process
of moving between countries (Henderson, 2009; Zenou, 2010). In other words, the rural
workers who migrate to a city without a hukou are considered as “illegal” migrants by the
local authorities. The Chinese government has tried to reduce rural urban migration by
imposing some costs on these “illegal” migrants. In particular, the latter do not have access
to social services and schools for their children. For example, one of the requirements for
having access to social housing is that at least one member of the household living in a city
must have a local permanent non agricultural hukou registration for more than ﬁve years.
The United States has also tried to restrict migration, especially Mexican migrants (see,
e.g. Durand et al., 1999). Even though this type of migration is between two diﬀerent
countries, the mechanism is relatively similar. In that case, there is a relatively small cost
to be caught (mainly deportation) so the United States has put more resources in trying to
catch and deport illegal migrants. The same applies to Europe, especially Spain and Italy
with illegal migrants from Africa.
Denote by 0 < α < 1 the probability of catching a migrant and C the cost for a migrant
to be caught (the cost C is the utility loss of a migrant who has been caught). In that case,
the expected utility of migrating is not anymore IC
U but
α










+ (1 − α)I
C
U
Indeed, when someone decides to migrate to the city, with probability α, he/she will be
caught, and, in that case, will be “deported” (i.e. sent back to the rural area) and will obtain
a utility equals to that of living in rural areas minus the utility loss C. With probability
1−α, the migrant is not caught and will obtain the expected utility of residing in cities IC
U.
As a result, the rural urban equilibrium condition can now be written as:
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The two other equations that determine LC (job creation) and LR (ﬂow equation) are not
directly aﬀected. As a result, the steady state equilibrium is now deﬁned by three unknowns
θC∗,LC∗, and LR∗ and three equations (27), (28), and (34). We have the following result:
Proposition 3 Assume that the productivity diﬀerence between rural and urban areas is
large enough.16 Then, an increase in α, the probability to be caught and/or C, the cost of
being caught for a migrant leads to:
(i) an increase in job creation in the city θC∗;
(ii) a decrease in urban employment LC∗.
(iii) an increase in rural employment LR∗.
The eﬀect on job creation θC∗ is quite straightforward. Indeed, when α or C increases,
less people migrate to the city. There is less competition for jobs and thus it is easier for
urban ﬁrms to ﬁll their vacancies. As a result, more ﬁrms enter the urban labor market
and job creation increases in the city. The eﬀect on rural employment is also quite easy to
understand. Even though more opportunities exist in the city (higher θC∗), the direct eﬀect
of deterring migration (through either an increase in α or C) is high enough to increase rural
employment. Concerning the impact on LC∗, the eﬀect is more subtle because an increase
in α or C aﬀects LC∗ only indirectly through θC∗ and LR∗. There are two opposite forces.
On the one hand, an increase in α or C positively aﬀects θC∗, which increases LC∗. On the
other hand, an increase in α or C positively aﬀects LR∗, which decreases LC∗ (because, in
steady state, ﬂows in and out employment have to be equal). The second eﬀect turns out to
be stronger and thus the net eﬀect is negative.
16The exact condition is given in the Appendix. See (49).
185 Understanding the diﬀerent policies
Let us now compare the three policies: subsidizing transportation, subsidizing ﬁrms’ entry
cost and restricting migration. We assume that the government has a ﬁxed amount of money
M that it wants to spend on a given policy. We will now add a government budget constraint,
analyze each policy and compare them.
5.1 Transportation policy
The government gives a subsidy σC for each commuter (employed or unemployed) so that









sτ, where 0 < σC < 1 is the subsidy. The government’s budget constraint














τ [(1 − s)LC∗ + s(N − LR∗)]
(35)
Since σC is between 0 and 1, M < τ
 




. Observe that, for a given
M, σC∗ is negatively aﬀected by LC∗ and positively by LR∗. Indeed, when urban employment
increases, more employed and less unemployed workers need to be subsidized but the former
commute more than the latter. As a result, when LC∗ increases, σC∗ has to decrease for
M to stay constant. The opposite occurs with LR∗ since it only aﬀects urban unemployed
workers (UC∗ = N − LC∗ − LR∗).
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where σC is given by (35). The transportation policy directly aﬀect job creation θC∗ (see
(36)) since it becomes cheaper to hire workers (urban wages decrease because of lower spatial
compensation) and rural urban migration LR∗ (see (38)) since it is cheaper to live in cities
(lower housing prices and commuting costs). Urban employment LC∗ is aﬀected by this
policy indirectly through θC∗ and LR∗. The new aspect here is that commuting costs are now
also aﬀected by LC∗ and LR∗ through the subsidy σC∗.
5.2 Subsidizing ﬁrms’ entry cost
Consider the second policy, which consists in subsidizing ﬁrms’ entry cost in cities, i.e.




γ instead of γ to enter the





Since θC = V C/sUC = V C/s
 






γsθC∗ (N − LC∗ − LR∗)
(39)
Since σC is between 0 and 1, M < γsθC∗
 
N − LC∗ − LR∗
 
. Observe that, for a given M,
SC∗ is positively aﬀected by both LC∗ and LR∗. Indeed, when urban or rural employment
increases, urban unemployment decreases, and thus the number of vacancies hold by ﬁrms is
reduced. As a result, when LC∗ or LR∗ increases, SC∗ has to increase for M to stay constant.
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20where SC∗ is given by (39). The entry cost policy directly aﬀect job creation θC∗ (see (40))
since it becomes cheaper to enter the labor market and rural urban migration LR∗ (see (42))
since the expected utility to live in cities increases because it is easier to ﬁnd a job there.
Urban employment LC∗ is only aﬀected indirectly through θC∗ and LR∗. Again, the new
aspect here is that ﬁrms’ entry costs are also aﬀected by LC∗ and LR∗ through the subsidy
SC∗.
5.3 Restricting migration
Let us now consider the last policy where the government spends a ﬁxed amount of money
Λ to catch rural migrants. This implies that now α = α(Λ) with α′(Λ) > 0. The local
government’s budget constraint can thus be written as:
M = Λ (43)
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The restricting migration policy directly aﬀects only rural urban migration LR∗ (see (46))
since it becomes more costly for rural workers to migrate. Both job creation θC∗ (see (44))
and urban employment LC∗ (see (45)) are only indirectly aﬀected by this policy through
LR∗.
6 Comparing policies
The transportation and entry cost policies are relatively similar in the sense that they both
directly aﬀect job creation and migration. There is, however, an important diﬀerence between
21these two policies. The transportation policy directly aﬀects the competition in the land
market because it reduces transport costs for all workers while the entry cost policy only
indirectly aﬀects the land market through job creation and migration. Finally, the restricting 
migration policy is quite diﬀerent since it directly aﬀects only rural urban migration. For
each policy, each steady state equilibrium is determined by three equations so it is diﬃcult
to see, for a given M, which policy will increase most the welfare. We would like now to run
some numerical simulations in order to give some intuitions of the mechanisms behind each
policy.



















and, the elasticity of the matching
rate (deﬁned as η(θC) = −q′(θC)θC/q(θC)) is equal to 0.5. The production function in the







where 0 < a < 1. The values of the parameters (in yearly terms) are the following. The
total population N is normalized to 100. The relative bargaining power of workers is equal
to η(θC), i.e. β = η(θC) = 0.5. The costs of maintaining a vacancy γ are equal to 1 per unit
of time while the urban productivity yC is 10. Pecuniary commuting costs τ are equal to
0.1 whereas search eﬀort s is 0.5 (i.e. the unemployed workers make half as many CBD trips
as the employed workers). The discount rate is r = 0.01, whereas the job destruction rate
rate is δ = 0.15, which means that, on average, there is a job is destroyed every six and half
years.
Let us calculate the steady state equilibrium. The numerical results of the steady state
equilibrium are displayed in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 here]
If we take the economy as a whole, 67.04 percent of workers are employed in the city
while 26.94 percent work in the rural area. The rest of the workers are unemployed. So
the unemployment rate in the economy is 6.02 percent but the one in the urban area, as
measured by the number of unemployed workers over the urban active population (and not
22the entire population), is 8.24 percent. There are roughly 34 percent of urban jobs that are
vacant, and the number of vacant job per urban worker is 46 percent. There is an important
productivity diﬀerence between the rural and the urban sectors, which results in stark wage
diﬀerences (urban wages are nearly ﬁve times higher than rural wages). The housing costs
in the city are quite high in the employment area but very low in the unemployment area,
capturing the idea that new migrants live in relatively distressed areas (shanty towns). For
example, when a rural worker migrates to the city, he/she lives in the unemployment area
where the highest land price is at x = LC, which is RC∗
L (LC∗) = RC∗
U (LC∗) = 0.301. For an
employed worker who lives in the more expensive location in the city, i.e. x = 0, the housing
price is 7, which is roughly 23 times more expensive.
In Table 1, we also give diﬀerent welfare values. First, the equilibrium total welfare in
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while the equilibrium total welfare in rural areas TSR∗ is the total production there since












Total = TSC∗ + TSR∗ is the total welfare in the economy. We also give the































We would like now to compare the diﬀerent policies at a given cost M. Table 2a displays
the results when the government has some ﬁnite budgetary resources equal to M = 4. This
table illustrates well the way each policy operates, as already highlighted in sections 4.1, 4.2,
and 4.3. First, it can be seen that the transportation policy is the most eﬃcient one since
it increases the total welfare most (either measured by the total welfare in the city TSC∗
or in the economy TS∗
Total). It also increases urban employment (from 67.04 percent to
86.15 percent) and reduces urban unemployment (from 8.24 percent to 7.70 percent) most.
17It is assumed here that the welfare in the city is the sum of utilities of workers, ﬁrms and landlords, even
if the latter do not live in the city (i.e. we have assumed absentee landlords).
23Quite naturally, when transportation is subsidized both rural employment and rural welfare
TSR∗ decrease. If we look at the two other policies, the eﬀects on urban employment and
unemployment are either small (entry cost policy) or even negative (restricting migration
policy). These results show that the transportation policy can have a very big impact on
labor outcomes in cities and therefore on welfare because it acts simultaneously on the land
and labor markets, creating amplifying eﬀects. Indeed, when τ is reduced, the housing price
(land market) decreases everywhere in the city and the urban wage (labor market) also
decrease. These are direct eﬀects. On the contrary, when ﬁrms’ entry costs are reduced,
only job creation (labor market) is directly aﬀected. Finally, when migration is restricted,
none of the markets is directly aﬀected, only migration is. This can explain why this last
policy has relatively small eﬀects on labor market outcomes in cities and large eﬀects on
outcomes in rural areas.
Second, for the same budget M = 4, the government needs to subsidize 45 percent of
commuting costs for all workers (σC∗ = 0.45) but only 11 percent of ﬁrms’ entry costs
(SC∗
= 0.11) . This shows that for the transportation policy to be eﬃcient, very important
improvements in public transport systems should be realized.
[Insert Table 2a here]
To check the robustness of our results, we have performed the same exercise for a higher
budget, M = 8, i.e. twice as much. The qualitative results remain unchanged with the
transportation policy being still the most eﬃcient. The eﬀects are, of course, much more
drastic with an important reduction in urban unemployment and in total land rent and
a huge increase in welfare for both urban residents and the economy as a whole. With
the transportation policy, few people end up living in rural areas because it becomes very
attractive to live in the city. In that case, the government need to subsidy up to 85 percent
of the commuting costs of all workers in the city.
[Insert Table 2b here]
We would like to conduct further robustness checks to see if indeed the transportation
policy is the most eﬃcient policy. We would like ﬁrst to vary the government budget from
M = 0 to 10 (roughly, from 0 to 1% of potential GDP). Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c present the
simulation results with respectively the unemployment rate, the total land rent value in the
24city and the total welfare in the economy on the vertical axis and M on the horizontal axis.
In all these ﬁgures, the horizontal line (that does not vary with M) is the market solution
(i.e. when M = 0). The thin solid curve describes the transportation policy while the thick
one corresponds to the restricting migration policy. Finally, the dash curve represents the
entry cost policy.
[Insert Figures 2a, 2b, 2c here]
The results we ﬁnd are in accordance with the previous ones (described in tables 2a and
2b). In all dimensions, the transportation policy is the most eﬃcient one whatever the level
of expenses of the government and, in fact, the higher the level of expenses M, the larger is
the gap between the diﬀerent policies. Indeed, if we look at the unemployment rate (Figure
2a), its value is relatively close to that of the entry cost policy but after M = 3, the gap
widens in favor of the transportation policy. As for the restricting migration policy, its eﬀect
on unemployment is pretty small, just slightly below that of the market solution (8.24%).
When M is equal to 10, the unemployment rate uC∗ is 6.65% when the transportation policy
is implemented while it is 7.18% and 8.15% for the entry cost and the restricting migration
policy, respectively. Concerning the total land rent in the city TLRC∗ (Figure 2b), it is
interesting to notice that it is always above the market solution when the entry cost policy
is implemented while it is always below for the restricting migration policy. As for the
transportation policy, it sharply increases for low value of M and then decreases to reach
very low values as soon as M is above 3. Finally, the total welfare in the economy TS∗
Total
(Figure 2c) when the transportation policy is considered is always above that of the other
policies and the gap sharply widens when M increases. It can be seen that, as compared
to the market solution, there is very little gain in terms of TS∗
Total when either the entry 
cost or the restricting migration policy is implemented. All these results indicate that the
transportation policy is the most eﬃcient policy and, as stated above, it is due to the fact
that it impacts directly on the land and the labor market, creating amplifying eﬀects.
We would like to explore other parts of parameter space to see if our results are robust.
In our simulations, we assumed that the entry cost γ is 1 (10% of a worker’s annual output).
This is relatively small and this could explain why subsidizing it would have little impact
on welfare. In Figure 3, we report the simulation results when γ varies between nearly zero
and 10. We ﬁx the government budget to M = 4.18 It can be seen that, again, there is a
18We have performed the same numerical simulations for diﬀerent values of M and the results are roughly
25large gap in terms of total welfare between the transportation policy and the other ones,
even though, not surprisingly, for all of them, welfare decreases with ﬁrms’ entry costs.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Another potentially important parameter is the Nash bargaining parameter β, that we
have ﬁxed to 0.5, as it is usually the case in numerical simulations of search models. For
example, Besley and Burgess (2004) have shown that it has an important impact on Indian
labor rights. We vary β between values close to zero and close to 1 and analyze its impact
on total welfare. Figure 4 reports the results. We ﬁnd the same type of results indicating
that the transportation policy is still the most eﬃcient one.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Even though these are just numerical simulations, we believe that they give some intuition
of the mechanisms behind each policy. We think that the transportation policy is the most
eﬃcient one because it acts directly on both the land and labor market. These results also
illustrate the fact that migration is not a bad thing per se, especially if it is accompanied by
policies that improve the quality of life in cities. As we have seen in the diﬀerent simulations,
the restricting migration policy increases the number of people living in rural areas but has a
small impact on urban employment and unemployment and may even educe the total welfare
in the economy. Thus, improving the transport infrastructure in cities can have important
positive eﬀects on urban employment despite the induced migration from rural areas.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we develop a rural urban migration model where the city is characterized
by both a search matching labor market and a land/housing market. We determine the
steady state equilibrium and study its properties. We then consider three diﬀerent policies:
a transport policy that improves the public transport system, an entry cost policy that en 
courages investment in cities and a restricting migration policy that imposes some costs on
migrants. We ﬁnd that these policies can have important positive eﬀects on urban employ 
ment and job creation while reducing rural employment. Because we explicitly model both
the same.
26the land and labor markets in the city, the mechanisms through which these positive eﬀects
operate are complex since there are amplifying eﬀects due to the interaction between these
two markets. We believe, however, that the transportation policy is the most eﬃcient one.
Indeed, when the local government increases the commuting cost subsidy, the land price
decreases everywhere in the city since the accessibility to the job center is less costly. As a
result, the cost of residing in the city is lower for new migrants so that the ﬂow of migrants
sharply increases. However, because commuting costs are lower, ﬁrms need to compensate
less workers for their spatial costs and thus the decrease in wages lead to more job creation.
The former eﬀect being much potent than the latter, the ﬁnal eﬀect of subsidizing commuting
costs is to increase urban employment and decrease rural employment. Our main message
here is that (local) governments should take into account the interaction between the two
markets when implementing a policy because of the resulting amplifying eﬀects. In partic 
ular, improving the transport infrastructure in cities can have important positive eﬀects on
urban employment in developing countries despite the induced migration from rural areas.
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31APPENDIX
Proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3
Before proving these propositions, let us ﬁrst analyze the steady state equilibrium. The
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and from the steady-state condition on ﬂows (28), we have
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Plugging this value in (48) and observing that wR
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productivity diﬀerence is large enough.











Since Φθ < 0, the sign of ∂θC
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which is clearly ambiguous.
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      is high enough, then ∂LC∗
∂τ > 0 and thus ∂LR∗
∂τ < 0.











Since Φθ < 0, the sign of ∂θC
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This is again ambiguous. If
     ∂θC∗
∂γ
      is low enough, then ∂LC∗
∂γ < 0. result due to direct and
indirect eﬀects.
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      is high enough, then ∂LC∗
∂γ > 0, and thus ∂LR∗
∂τ < 0.
• Let us ﬁnally prove Proposition 3.
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It is easily veriﬁed that, as before, a suﬃcient condition for Φθ < 0 if (49). Furthermore, by
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37Table 2a. Comparing policy measures at given cost M = 4 (σC∗= 45%,S
C∗= 11%,Λ = 4)
Policy
LC∗ LR∗ θ∗ uC∗ vC∗ TLRC∗ TSC∗ TSR∗ TS∗
Total Ranking
Market
solution 67.04 26.94 11.16 8.24 45.98 24,577 42,425 10,381 52,806
Transportation 86.15 6.66 12.92 7.70 49.77 22,358 63,746 5,162 68,908 First
policy
Entry-cost 67.66 26.63 12.61 7.79 49.12 24,904 42,723 10,320 53,043 Second
policy
Restricting 65.89 28.22 11.26 8.21 46.21 23,735 42,122 10,624 52,746 Third
migration
Base case: yC = 10, δ= 0.15, A= 20,a= 0.5, N = 100, γ = 1,
r= 0.01, β = 0.5, s= 0.5, τ = 0.5, α = M
1+M, C = 4.
38Table 2b. Comparing policy measures at given cost M = 8 (σC∗= 85%,S
C∗= 21%,Λ = 8)
Policy
LC∗ LR∗ θ∗ uC∗ vC∗ TLRC∗ TSC∗ TSR∗ TS∗
Total Ranking
Market
solution 67.04 26.94 11.16 8.24 45.98 24,577 42,425 10,381 52,806
Transportation 91.26 1.90 16.02 6.97 55.86 6,957 84,246 2,758 87,004 First
policy
Entry-cost 68.24 26.33 14.21 7.37 52.38 25,207 42,998 10,263 53,261 Second
policy
Restricting 64.72 29.52 11.37 8.17 46.45 22,893 41,799 10,866 52,665 Third
migration
Base case: yC = 10, δ= 0.15, A= 20,a= 0.5, N = 100, γ = 1,
r= 0.01, β = 0.5, s= 0.5, τ = 0.5, α = M
1+M, C = 4.
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Figure 1: The equilibrium land rent in the city and in the rural area
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U U I I x ΨFigure 2a: Unemployment rate and government’s spending under different policies 
 
 











Figure 2b: Total land rent and government’s spending under different policies 
 
 











 Figure 2c: Total welfare and government’s spending under different policies 
 




































 Figure 3: Total welfare and firms’ entry costs under different policies (M = 4) 
 
 













Figure 4: Total welfare and bargaining power under different policies (M = 4) 
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